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The Relationship between the Financial and the Real Sector and the 
Present Financial and Economic Crisis – Portugal 
 
Sérgio Lagoa, Emanuel Leão, Ricardo Paes Mamedei, and Ricardo Barradas 
I. Introduction 
This chapter develops our previous work (Lagoa et al., 2013) on the Portuguese financial system’s 
evolution in the past three decades. In that work we have extensively documented the various signs of 
financialisation in the Portuguese economy. For example, by 2007 Portugal had the fourth highest share 
of finance and insurance in GDP (after Ireland, the UK, and Cyprus), being among the countries in which 
this indicator had increased the most since the mid-1990s. Between 1997 and 2008, the Gross 
Operational Surplus (GOS) of financial corporations rose from nearly 12% to more than 23% of the total 
GOS of Portuguese firms (including both financial and non-financial firms). Largely as a result of the 
strong expansion of bank credit, financial assets increased from nearly 450% of GDP in 1995 to over 
650% in 2008, while household debt and non-financial corporations reached the highest levels among 
EU Member States.  
In the present context we focus on the effects of financialisation in Portugal on the long-run 
macroeconomic development and, especially, on the financial and economic crises that hit the country 
in recent years. 
The remaining of the chapter is divided into four main blocs. In section II we discuss the main features of 
the development of the Portuguese economy since the early 1980s until the recent economic and 
financial crises and the main links to changes in the domestic financial system. Section III develops this 
analysis by looking in greater detail at four different channels through which financialisation affects the 
evolution of the Portuguese economy: income distribution; investment in capital stock; private 
consumption; and the current account. Finally, section IV presents the main conclusions. ii 
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II. The long boom and the early bust: the Portuguese economy in the era of 
financialisation  
Between 1980 and 2013 the Portuguese economy grew at an average rate of 2% per year – the 8th 
highest rate among the 15 Western European countries that formed the EU until 2004iii. In spite of this 
median performance, the aggregate behaviour of the Portuguese economy over this period did not 
coincide with the EU average: first, as is typical of small countries, it exacerbated the moves throughout 
each cycle, growing faster than the average during the upturns and falling deeper in downturns; more 
importantly, there is a sharp contrast in aggregate economic performance before and after the turn of 
the millennium.  
Between 1986 (the year in which Portugal accessed the EEC) and 2000, the Portuguese economy 
experienced the third fastest growth rate among the EU15 countries (only after Ireland and Luxemburg), 
with GDP increasing at an impressive average annual rate of 4.1%, in real terms. In contrast, between 
2000 and 2013 economic growth nearly stalled, with an average rate of 0.1%, the second lowest in the 
whole EU (only higher than Italy’s). Contrary to what occurred in other countries on the periphery of the 
euro area – such as Greece, Ireland, and Spain –, the dismal performance of the Portuguese economy in 
the recent past is not just a post-subprime crisis phenomenon. Portugal started to fall behind the EU 
average GDP growth rate from 2000 onwards – while the economies of the other three former 
‘Cohesion countries’ kept growing until 2007 at average growth rates that varied between 3.4% and 5%. 
The strong growth experienced by the Portuguese economy from the mid-1980s to 2000 was mostly 
driven by domestic demand: private consumption was responsible for 70% of GDP growth in the period, 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) for 36%, and public consumption for 21%iv. Although private 
consumption remained the main contributor to GDP growth over the period, GFCF played an 
outstanding role in the Portuguese growth experience of the late twentieth century, when compared to 
other EU15 countries (the contribution of GFCF to GDP growth in 1986-2000 was higher only in the 
Spanish case).  
The investment dynamics in Portugal during this period is both a cause and a result of economic growth: 




In fact, the second half of the 1980s was a favourable period for the European economies, namely as a 
result of declining oil prices and the implementation of the European Single Market programme. In the 
Portuguese case, economic growth was also fostered by accession to the EEC (in 1986), the massive 
inflow of FDI (which peaked in the early 1990s) and of European structural fundsv, as well as the overall 
climate of economic stabilisation and liberalisation that followed an IMF-led bailout programme in 1983-
1985 (which was marked by financial repression and harsh austerity measures)vi. Moreover, real wages 
increased fast between 1985 and 2000, reflecting both the strong GDP growth over the period and an 
improvement in the wage share of GDP in the early 1990s. 
No less importantly, the surge in investment experienced by Portugal would hardly have been possible 
without the wide availability of credit for domestic firms and households, in particular from the mid-
1990s onwards. This, in turn, was a result of both supply- and demand-side developments in the 
financial system.  
Regarding the supply-side, the Portuguese banking sector went through a deep process of privatisation, 
liberalisation, and deregulation from the mid-1980s, which  led to: a rapid increase in the number of 
banking institutions (from 27 in 1989 to 47 in 1995); a strong reduction of public bank assets (from 74% 
of total banking sector assets in 1991 to 22% in 1996); the entrance of foreign banks in the Portuguese 
market (increasing from 3% of  bank assets in 1991 to 8% in 1995-1996); and an increase in competition 
(Antão et al., 2009). These developments in the Portuguese banking sector, combined with easier access 
to external financing by banks, allowed for a substantial expansion of credit to the domestic economy.  
On the demand side, the growth of credit was fostered by: (i) a sharp decline in nominal and real 
interest ratesvii (as a result of the ‘nominal convergence’ process, in anticipation of the European 
Monetary Union); and (ii) the increase in real incomes, which was diffusely perceived as permanent (as a 
result of the extended period of strong economic growth). 
Thus, between 1995 and 2000, outstanding loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and households 
more than doubled in real terms, increasing from 50% to 93% of GDP (Figure 1). Nearly 3/5 of this 
growth was directed at households, ¾ of which were mortgage loans. Loans to NFCs also increased 
rapidly in the second half of the 1990s, from 28% to 44% of the GDP. Construction and real estate 
activities were responsible for a substantial part (nearly 2/5) of the growth in credit to NFCs, although 
the expansion of credit during the period was a common feature across industries. After 2000, the pace 
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of growth of bank credit in the Portuguese economy slowed down, and became even more focused on 
household mortgage credit and on credit to NFCs operating in real estate and construction industries. 
 
Figure 1 – GDP and bank loans to households and non-financial 
corporations, 1980-2014 (in M€, at 2005 prices) 
 
 
Source: Bank of Portugal and AMECO 
 
By 2007, Portuguese households had the 6th highest level of debtviii in percentage of GDP among the EU 
Member States, while the Portuguese NFCs held the 4th position in the corresponding rankingix. Far from 
being a specific feature of the Portuguese economy, the rapid increase of private indebtedness from the 
mid-1990s until the advent of the subprime crisis was common to all the countries on the periphery of 
the euro area. What is peculiar about the Portuguese indebtedness experience is the timing: while in 
other countries the levels of indebtedness grew slowly until the turn of the century, accelerating only 
after 2000, in the Portuguese case the reverse happened – private sector debt in percentage of GDP 
grew most rapidly in the second half of the 1990s, growing slowly thereafter (particularly in the case of 










While the rapid growth of credit and private indebtedness in Portugal in the second half of the 1990s is 
explained by developments both in the supply-side and in the demand-side of the financial markets, the 
slow growth of credit in the first years of the new millennium was determined by: (i) the high levels of 
private indebtedness, which were already evident by the turn of the century; and (ii) the aggregate 
performance of the Portuguese economy in the following years.  
As mentioned before, the contrast between the economic performance of Portugal between 1986-2000 
and 2000-2007 is overwhelming – in fact, it has no parallel among the EU15 countriesx. A number of 
events account for this dramatic change of course.  
Soon after the inception of the euro, in reaction to signs of overheating in the euro zone, the ECB 
started to tighten its monetary policy, increasing the main reference interest rate from 2.5% in early 
1999 to 4.75% in late 2000. As a result, the Euribor 6-month rate doubled, from 2.6% to 5.2%. Given the 
high levels of debt accumulated in the previous years, the steep increase in interest rates had a 
significant impact on the levels of available income and, consequently, on domestic demand. In the 
same period, the bursting of the ‘dot.com bubble’ in the stock markets (starting in March 2000 and 
lasting through 2001) triggered the first international economic crisis of the new millennium. These two 
events combined had a strong negative impact on domestic demand and employment, being largely 
accountable for the increase in the Portuguese public deficit, which reached 4.8% of GDP in 2001xi. As a 
result, Portugal was the first country in the euro area to break the EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
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The following year, the Portuguese authorities were committed to complying with the SGP rules, 
following a pro-cyclical, contractionary fiscal policy, which further contributed to the 1% drop in GDP in 
2003. 
Concomitantly, the Portuguese economy was facing the consequences of a combination of structural 
weaknesses and international developments (Mamede et al., 2014). In particular, growing competition 
from the emerging Asian economies (largely as a result of the agreements reached by the EU at the 
WTO and other fora) had a substantial impact on a number of traditional industries (namely textiles, 
wearing apparel, footwear, wood and paper), which were responsible for a significant part of the 
manufacturing value added, exports and employment. Moreover, anticipating the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement in 2004, several multinational firms (especially in the automotive and related industries) 
shifted their productive capacity to some of the new member states, taking advantage of lower wages, 
higher educational levels, and the geographical proximity to the main European markets. Additionally, 
after 2000 Portugal experienced a real exchange rate appreciation, largely as a result of the strong 
appreciation of the euro against the US dollarxii, imposing further pressure on exporting industries that 
are highly reliant on cost-competitiveness. 
The combination of a weak specialization profile with deleterious trade and real exchange rate 
developments had a devastating impact on the traditional Portuguese productive fabric. Between 2000 
and 2007 Portugal lost jobs in manufacturing at an average annual rate of 2%, one of the fastest rates of 
deindustrialization in the EU (Mamede, 2014)xiii. Similarly, the growth of manufacturing valued added in 
the same period was the 4th lowest in the EU (after Cyprus, UK, and Denmark), at a meagre 0.5%. 
When subsequent external shocks hit the international economy – namely, the successive increases in 
ECB interest rates in 2005-2008, the substantial appreciation of the euro against the dollar in 2007-2008, 
the peak in oil and commodity prices in 2008 and, finally, the Great Recession – Portugal was still going 
through an adjustment process characterised by low economic growth, rising unemployment rates 
(from 4.5% in 2000 to 8.9% in 2007) and, largely as a consequence, a steady rise in the public debt ratio 
(which surpassed the euro zone average for the first time in 2006, reaching 63.9% of GDP). 
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III. Long-run effects of financialisation on the economy through different channels 
The long-term effects of financialisation on the economy can be transmitted through different channels. 
In this section we discuss the relevance of the following main channels in the Portuguese case: the 
distribution of income; investment in capital stock; consumption; and the current account. 
III.1. Financialisation and distribution 
Financialisation processes are often associated with increasing income inequality, both in terms of 
functional (Stockhammer, 2012) and personal income distribution (Kus, 2012). Regarding the former, 
the adjusted wage share in Portugal decreased between de mid-1970s and the early 1990s, indicating a 
worsening of functional income distribution (Figure 3).  However, between 1994 and 2009 the adjusted 
wage share remained essentially constant, only declining after 2010 in the context of economic crises 
and adjustment.  
 
Figure 3 – Adjusted wage share as percentage of GDP at 
current market prices per person employed 
 
Note: adjusted for full time equivalent employees 
Source: AMECO 
 
If financialisation is responsible for the decline in wage share, rentiers should benefit from it. From 1980 
to 2013 property income (dividends, interest and rents received less paid by households) did not show 
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an overall positive tendencyxiv. However, this type of income increased between 2003 and 2013 from 6% 
to 8.5% of the GNI, basically due to the increase in dividends.  
Inequality in personal disposable income, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased strongly in 
1989-94 (+3.1 p.p.), that is, before the fast growth of finance in 1995-2009xv. After 1995, there was an 
overall decline in income inequality from 37.0% in 1995 to 34.5% in 2012, with a temporary increase in 
2001-05 (+1 p.p.) and another increase of 1 p.p. in the period of economic crisis (2011-12). Despite the 
improvement in disposable income distribution in the past two decades, in 2010 Portugal was still one 
of the most unequal countries in the EU15. Moreover, since 1995, the reduction in inequality has been 
achieved by the improvement of the position of the poorest households, and not of the middle classes 
(with regard to the richest households). In fact, there was also a clear increase in the share of income 
held by the top 0.1% incomes, from 1.5% in 1989 to 2.5% in 2005xvi. Thus decrease in overall inequality 
seems to result from the distributive policies put in place over the period: the Gini coefficient of income 
before taxes and social transfers in the period 2004-11 actually increased by 3.3 p.p.  
In summary, we do not find a generalised increase of either personal inequality (after taxes and social 
transfers) or functional inequality in the period in which finance grew the most. However, three remarks 
need to be made. Firstly, there may be some negative effects of financialisation on inequality because 
there was an increase in the Gini coefficient of disposable income between 2001-2005, an increase in 
the Gini coefficient of income before taxes and social transfers in the period 2004-11, an increase in the 
rentier income share in 2003-2013, a substantial increase in the share of income held by top incomes 
from 1989 to 2005, and the middle class did not improve its position. Secondly, the economic crisis in 
Portugal, partially explained by the growth of finance, substantially increased both functional and 
personal income inequality. Thirdly, there were other factors avoiding the increase in inequality at the 
period, namely the growth of social policies.   
 
III.2. Financialisation and investment in capital stock 
The investment rate in Portugal increased to relatively high values between 1994 and 2001 from 21.6% 
to 26.2% of GDP, with two key explanatory factors being the reduction in interest rates during the 
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convergence process to the euro and the rapid growth of credit. Investment was also favoured by the 
increase in the proportion of long-term loans in total debt from 52% in 1995 to 69% in 2001 (this trend 
continued until 2011).  
In contrast, after 2001 the share of total investment in GDP declined to 16.4% in 2013 due to a 
combination of factors, including high levels of indebtedness of households and firms, low growth 
prospects, an increase in interest rates, and the exhaustion of investment needs in earlier periodsxvii.  
Regarding the ratio of Gross Fixed Capital Formation of non-financial corporations (NFCs) to GDP, we 
observe a slightly negative trend since 1980 and especially after 2000 ( 
Figure 4). The indebtedness level of NFCs may be a factor explaining the slowdown after 2000, since it 
increased the difficulty in getting additional funding.  
Figure 4 –Gross Fixed Capital Formation of NFC in % of GDP 
 
Sources: INE Contas Nacionais (up to 1994) and Eurostat (from 1995). 
 
There is a stream of research within the financialisation literature (Orhangazi, 2008b; Hein, 2009; among 
others) that analyse the impact of financialisation on corporate investment through two main channels: 
the rise of investment in financial assets by NFCs and the pressure exerted over these corporations to 
increase their payments to financial marketsxviii. In Portugal, financial receipts in percentage of Gross 
Operating Surplus (GOS) increased from 11.8% in 2002 to 33.7% in 2008; while financial payments 
increased from 40.2% to 88.1% in the same period. The main effect of financialisation may have been 
felt through an increase in dividends (both paid and received), which had a long term tendency to 
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increase since 1985. Therefore, the increase of financial payment and receipts in 2002-08 may have 
contributed to the decline in NFC’s investment.  
Econometric analysis confirms the negative effect of financial payments – but not of financial receipts – 
on NFCs’ investment, mostly through the long-run relation among the variables (Barradas and Lagoa, 
2014). Likewise, firms’ debt also has a negative effect on investment.   
The effect of financialisation on investment of NFC may have also resulted from the increase of 
household indebtedness (Mamede, 2014). After household debt reached high values, it implied a slow 
growth in aggregate demand, leading to a reduction of investment by firms oriented to the domestic 
market.  
Arguably, financialisation leads to increasing payments by NFCs to shareholders and debtholders, thus 
reducing internal funds available to finance investment. In Portugal, we observe that the period of 
highest growth of finance was characterised by a slight decrease in the internal finance of investment: 
this source represented 66% of NFC’s investment in 1986-94 and only 60% in 1995-2008xix. 
In conclusion, the negative effects of financialisation on investment have been felt in four areas: an 
increase in payments to financial investors (mainly in 2003-08), a decrease in the internal means to 
finance investment, an increase of the debt to equity ratio of NFC to high values (especially after 2000), 
and a rise in indebtedness of households. 
 
III.3. Financialisation and consumption 
Since the mid-1980s Portugal has witnessed a huge transformation in the behaviour of the country’s 
households. Their savings rate dropped from more than 20% to nearly 7% before the economic and 
financial crisis beginning in late 2007. The fall was particularly pronounced during the decade that 
followed Portuguese accession to the EEC in 1986. Private consumption grew fast between the mid-
1980s and 2000, fostered by the greater availability of credit for consumption and a reduced need of 
savings for precautionary reasons. This period was also marked by a change in consumption habits, 
evidenced, for example, by the rapid diffusion of retail trade chains, big shopping centres, and 
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hypermarkets, all of which selling international brands at prices that were gradually becoming accessible 
to the expanding middle class. 
The further deregulation of the financial system and easier access to foreign funds by domestic banks from the 
mid-1990s led to a strong growth in credit, with mortgage credit growing faster than credit for consumption. 
Although bank credit to Portuguese households has been largely dominated by mortgage loans, bank credit to 
households for consumption and other purposes also grew considerably between 1990 and 2000, from 2.6% to 
14.2% of GDP ( 
Figure 5). In order to finance their consumption (namely, of cars, home appliances, furniture, etc.), 
besides borrowing from banks, households also borrowed from nonbank financial institutions, especially 
Societies for Acquisition by Credit and, to a much lesser extent, Leasing Societies . 
 
Figure 5 – Bank credit to households for consumption and other purposes (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Bank of Portugal 
 
The growth of consumption was fuelled by the liberalisation of the financial system (after a period of 
financial repression associated with the IMF interventions of 1977/78 and 1983/85), the significant drop 
in nominal and real interest rates from the early 1990s, and the strong growth of GDP and real wages 
until 2000.  
Recall that, since the mid-1980s, the Portuguese financial system (in particular, the banking system) 
developed fast. The opening of the banking sector to new entrants in 1985, the end of the credit ceilings 
regime (in which the central bank set the maximum amounts that each bank could lend) in 1990, the 
creation and development of the Interbank Money Market from 1991, and the new legislative 
framework in 1992 – all these factors contributed to an increase in the banking sector’s ability to supply 
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loans to meet increasing demand both from households and firms. Moreover, a new legal framework – 
named “General Regime for Credit Institutions and Financial Societies” – established the ground that 
allowed the aforementioned Societies for the Acquisition by Credit and Leasing Societies to thrive.  
Financial liberalisation produced a strong wealth effect through the reduction of liquidity constraints 
faced by households, which translated into higher levels of consumption. Castro (2007) and Farinha 
(2008) both confirm this effect empirically, showing that it was higher than in the US or in other 
European countries. Wealth related with houses had a larger effect on consumption than financial 
wealth, which indicates that households use mortgage loans to finance consumption. 
Thus, private consumption in Portugal grew markedly between the middle 1980s and the end of the 
century. After 2000, though, and even before the subprime crisis, Portugal displayed the 6th lowest level 
of consumption growth in the EU, reflecting the sharp slowdown in economic growth  discussed in detail 
in section II, partly resulting from the debt accumulated by Portuguese households in the preceding 
period. 
III.4. Financialisation and the current account 
Portugal has historically displayed a negative current account balance, the intensity of which has 
changed from period to period. Between 1960 and 1973, the current account deficit remained at around 
2.5% of GDP, increasing to an average of nearly 9% in the following decade (1974-1985), due to the 
combination of the international crises of the 1970s and the social and political upheavals in the 
aftermath of the Portuguese democratic revolution of 1974xx. The external imbalances accumulated 
during this period led to two IMF interventions in Portugal (1977/78 and 1983/85)xxi, which favoured a 
rapid improvement of the goods and services balance (from -20% of GDP in 1982 to -6% in 1986). 
The combination of gradual macroeconomic stabilisation and financial liberalisation, and the decrease in 
interest rates in the international markets, contributed to the improvement of the balance of net 
primary income from the mid-1980s onward, partly compensating for the return of the external trade 
deficits to levels around 10-12% of GDP. As such, between 1986 and 1995 the current account deficit 
averaged 6% of GDP, while the economy’s net borrowing was around 4% (given the positive 
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contribution of capital transfers from the European structural funds to the Portuguese external 
balances). 
After 1995 and until the subprime crisis the Portuguese current account experienced substantial 
deterioration, from an average of -4.7% in 1995-1997 to -10.4% in 2005/2007 (-2.2% to -9.1%, when 
current and capital accounts are both considered). By 2007 Portugal had the 8th highest current account 
deficit (as a percentage of GDP) in the EU28 and the 5th highest in the euro area. Lately, the current 
account deficit peaked at 12.6% in 2008 and decreased since then, turning to a modest surplus (driven 
by the steep improvement in the balance of goods and services) as a result of the recession and the 
adjustment strategy being followed since 2010xxii. 
The deterioration of the current account after 1995 is common to all the countries of the Southern 
periphery of the euro area, and indeed to most EU Member Statesxxiii. The aggravation of the current 
account deficit in Portugal between 1995/1997 and 2005/2007 (6.9 percentage points of GDP) was, in 
fact, less severe than in Ireland (7.9), Spain (9.1), and Greece (11.7).  
Analysing in greater detail the evolution of the main components of the current and capital accounts, 
before and after the turn of the century, the negative change in the Portuguese external accounts 
between 1996-1997 and 2006-2007 was mostly determined by the following four main factors (in 
decreasing order of relevance): 
(i) the  outflow of investment income;  
(ii) the growth of imports of goods;  
(iii) the decrease in net current and capital transfers from the EU; and  
(iv) the decrease in remittances from emigrants (in percentage of GDP). 
 
The last two factors – which together account for nearly half of the weakening of the Portuguese 
external accounts between the mid-1990s and the eve of the subprime crisis – are essentially explained 
by broad institutional, demographic, and international exchange rate phenomena. That is, they cannot 
be directly associated with the financialisation of the Portuguese economy. 
As regards the determinants of the increase in imports of goods in Portugal after 1995 (point ii above), 
one should distinguish between different periods. As discussed in section II, domestic demand 
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experienced strong growth in the second half of the 1990s, fostered by the rapid expansion of credit to 
households (mostly in mortgage loans) and to non-financial firms (across all industries, but especially in 
construction and real estate). As a result, GDP grew fast, and imports grew even faster over this period, 
from 29% of GDP in 1995 to 35% in 2000. During this period, financialisation had a direct impact on the 
growth of imports, by fostering domestic demand. In later periods (especially after 2003), the growth of 
imports is explained by a combination of the aforementioned nominal exchange rate appreciation with 
the increase in unit labour costs (see Section II): this led to an appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate, leaving the traditional Portuguese industries even more exposed to competition from the emerging 
economies, which translated into an increasing penetration of imports in the domestic market of the 
corresponding industries (which are essentially based on consumer products). 
Finally, the impact of the financialisation of the domestic economy on the deterioration of the 
Portuguese external balances after 1995 is even clearer in the case of the outflow of investment income. 
The growth of the latter was essentially determined by the payment of interest by residents to foreign 
creditors.xxiv In turn, the increase in interest paid to foreigners is explained by the strong growth of credit 
to households and non-financial corporations since the mid-1990sxxv.  
The persistence of high external deficits in Portugal since the mid-1990s was fostered by the country’s 
participation in the European monetary union. The nearly full elimination of the exchange risk premium 
and the easier access to intra-EU monetary markets allowed for the prolonged financing of external 
deficits in Portugal. Had Portugal maintained its own currency, not only would the flow of foreign capital 
to finance the growth of credit to domestic agents  have been reduced, but also the outflow of capital 
would have favoured an exchange rate depreciation, which would have contributed to improving the 
current account. 
IV. Financialisation and the economic and financial crises as the crisis of finance-
dominated capitalism 
The first point to grasp about the nature of the successive crises that have affected the Portuguese 
economy since 2007 is that they did not originate either in the bursting of a domestic house price 
bubble or the significant exposure of the Portuguese financial system to ‘toxic products’. 
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In Portugal, as in most European countries, there was no subprime market as in the US, despite a similar 
evolution of interest rates and the upward trend of house prices in some European countries (Bank of 
Portugal, 2008). Instead, the crucial aspect of the financialisation process in Portugal was the strong 
increase in credit to households and firms that took place from the mid-1990s. As we have discussed in 
the previous sections, this has led to high levels of private debt, as well as the decrease in Portuguese 
banks’ solvability to low levels in comparison to other European countries (Lagoa et al, 2013).  
According to the Bank of Portugal (2010), Portuguese house prices have evolved in line with 
fundamental factors, contrary to what happened in other countries. This report quotes an IMF study 
stating that in 2007 deviations of house prices in relation to fundamentals were around 30% in the UK, 
20% in Ireland, between 10% and 20% in France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands; and about 7% in the 
US. In Portugal, the deviation was close to 0%. 
In the same vein, Portuguese banks did not hold 'toxic financial products' in their portfolios, having 
avoided the losses associated with these products. The main problem faced by Portuguese banks in the 
immediate aftermath of the subprime crisis was the difficulty in obtaining funding in international 
financial markets.  
Still, this funding difficulty was overcome by the Portuguese government’s scheme of state guarantees 
for the issue of securitised debt by Portuguese banks, as well as the huge liquidity offered by the ECB. 
Moreover, the ECB reduced its key interest rate from 4.25% in October 2008 to 1.00% in May 2009, also 
putting in place some extraordinary full-allotment refinancing operations.  At the beginning of 2012, the 
ECB again reduced its key interest rate to 0.75%, a new record low since the creation of the euro area.  
Additionally, in a context of high risk aversion and the intensification of flight-to-quality, the increase in 
demand for deposits by households helped to mitigate the funding difficulties of Portuguese banks. 
Synek (2009) asserts that after the outbreak of the subprime crisis Portuguese households increased 
their investments in cash, deposits and public debt, to the detriment of shares, investment funds, and 
other financial assets. During this period, Portuguese banks adopted aggressive strategies for attracting 
deposits, offering high interest rates compared with other financial instruments such as Treasury bonds. 
Nonetheless, the profitability of Portuguese banks fell strongly in 2008, reflecting the drop in 
commission fees, the increase in funding costs, and losses in investment portfolios. The international 
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activity of banking groups mitigated these negative results, namely through the increase of the financial 
margin. 
Yet the increase in perceived credit risk led Portuguese banks to increase interest rate spreads in credit, 
which implied a considerable negative impact on private consumption and gross fixed capital formation. 
According to the Bank of Portugal (2010), Portuguese households also decreased their investment in 
housing due to the higher level of interest rates. This contributed to the slowdown in the growth of 
house prices between 2007 and 2009. Given the deterioration of consumer confidence, as well as the 
reduction in employment, the savings rate has reversed the downward trend observed since 2005, 
which also impacted negatively on private consumption. 
In this context, the Portuguese economy began to decelerate in the first quarter of 2008 and slipped 
into a recession, unprecedented in the post-war period, in the third quarter of 2008, similarly to most 
advanced economies.  
Initially, the Portuguese economy was not especially affected by the subprime crisis, experiencing a 
decrease in GDP that was smaller than the euro area’s in 2009. In part this was a result of the 
counter-cyclical effect of both discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policies which were in place 
during 2009xxvi. However, this led to an increase in the public deficit that was more pronounced than the 
euro area average. This took place in a country that struggled to maintain the public deficit below 3% 
between 2001 and 2008. As a consequence, Portuguese public debt increased to levels considerably 
above the euro area average in 2010 and 2011, when it was close to that average in 2009. 
With a record of dismal GDP growth since 2000, high levels of indebtedness of both firms and 
households, a gradual increase in public debt until 2008 and a rapid one thereafter, the Portuguese 
economy was particularly vulnerable to the speculative attacks against sovereign bonds in the euro zone 
which started in late 2009. Following Greece in early 2010 and Ireland later that year, Portugal 
submitted a request for financial assistance to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2011. The Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Portuguese Government and the troika composed of the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the IMF – which established the terms of the adjustment programme that would accompany 
the EFSF’s loan – fixed as its main objectives the rebalancing of Portuguese public finances and the 
adoption of a number of measures to strengthen the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy. 
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In general, the adjustment programme implemented in Portugal between May 2011 and May 2014 did 
not represent a dramatic break with the recent past with regard to the measures relating to public 
finances. Several policy initiatives in this field had been adopted in previous years, including the 
following: reducing the number of public sector workers and their real wages; reducing the number of 
public agencies and managers; cutting back social expenditure; downsizing public investment 
programmes; privatising state-owned firms; decreasing tax benefits for household expenditure  on 
education and healthcare; imposing extra taxes on pensions and decreasing tax benefits for pensioners; 
increasing the VAT rate; increasing the maximum marginal rate in personal income tax; introducing a 
new tax on stock market capital gains; extending the base of social security contributions to previously 
excluded forms of compensation; among others. Concerning these domains, the Portuguese adjustment 
programme essentially emphasised the need to proceed with the implementation of the measures 
already in place and, in some cases, to reinforce some of them (for example, imposing stricter limits on 
social benefits, greater cuts in public investment, and stricter control of the budgetary process at all 
levels – central and local administration, quasi-public agencies, and state-owned firms). 
Such austerity measures have resulted in a steep decrease in economic activity and employment, which 
was much more severe than initially foreseen: while the original adjustment programme forecast a GDP 
year-on-year change of -1.8% in 2012 and 1.2% in 2013, the actual figures were -3.2% and -1.4%, 
respectively; the unemployment rate was expected to peak at 12.9% in 2012, but reached 16.5% in 2013 
(notwithstanding the historically high levels of emigration). These outcomes had a negative impact on 
public finance targets: the budget deficit was expected to be cut from 9.1% of GDP in 2010 to 3% in 
2013, but by the end of this year it was still at 5%; public debt was expected to peak at 108.6% of GDP in 
2013, but it was by then near 130% – and growing. The failure to achieve the fiscal targets led the troika 
and the national authorities to introduce additional austerity measures, which further hindered the 
economic recovery. 
One area in which the programme was considered successful was the evolution of the external balances. 
According to the initial programme, the current account deficit was expected to decrease from 10% of 
GDP in 2010 (a value similar to the average of the decade ending in that year) to near 0% in 2015. Such 
an impressive result was expected to accrue from the combined effects of low wage growth and reforms 
to the labour market (namely, easing dismissal restrictions, restricting the scope of collective 
agreements, reducing the duration and amount of unemployment benefits, etc.), which, it was 
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expected, would help to restore the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy. In fact, the 
Portuguese current account became slightly positive in 2013. This, however, is largely explained by the 
steep decrease in imports, due to the drop in domestic consumption and investment, raising doubts 
regarding the sustainability of the recent improvement in the current account in the event of a recovery. 
 
V. Summary and conclusions 
To sum up, the process of financialisation in Portugal was essentially characterised by an exponential 
increase in bank credit to the private sector. In a first moment this fostered a rapid growth of GDP, led 
by private demand, which translated into high levels of private indebtedness, and ultimately proved to 
be unsustainable. In this sense, the experience of the Portuguese economy in the past two decades has 
not been substantially different from those of Greece, Spain, and Ireland – although in the case of 
Portugal the period of fast growth induced by easier access to cheap credit ended earlier. Thus, we 
suggest that the experience of those four countries, notwithstanding some national specificities, could 
be subsumed under the label ‘debt-led domestic demand growth’ – rather than distinguishing, as Hein 
(2012) does, the Portuguese experience from the remaining three cases (labelling the former ‘domestic 
demand-led growth’ and the latter ‘debt-led consumption boom’). 
In this report we have discussed more deeply the effects of financialisation on the development of the 
Portuguese economy through four different channels: income distribution; private consumption; real 
investment; and the current and capital accounts. While the impact of financialisation on the external 
accounts is clear – as was mentioned above, it is essentially related both to the increase in interest 
payments and to losses in cost competitiveness – its impact through the remaining channels is less 
obvious. 
As regards income distribution, we have shown that the levels of personal income inequality (after taxes 
and social transfers) and functional inequality have not changed substantially during the period in which 
finance grew the most (1995-2009). However, it should be noted that other factors were at work during 
this period which affected income distribution in Portugal, namely the growing size of social policies.  
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The wide availability of cheap credit had a strong impact on corporate investment in the second half of 
the 1990s.  Investment was also favoured by the extension of average maturities of bank loans.  In 
contrast, after 2001 the share of total investment in GDP declined in Portugal due to a combination of 
factors, including the high levels of indebtedness of households and firms. The available econometric 
analyses conclude that financialisation has had a negative impact on investment through the growth of 
financial payments by Portuguese firms; this suggests that corporate investment in Portugal was 
negatively affected by a reduction in “internal means of finance” (borrowing the expression from Hein, 
2009, 2012; and Hein and Dodig, 2013), one of the channels through which, according to the literature, 
financialisation may constrain real investment.   
Finally, the growth of private consumption in Portugal from the late 1980s benefited not only from the 
expansion of credit for consumption and, especially, for house purchase (which was partially used for 
consumption purposes), but also from the wealth effects deriving from the drop in real interest rates 
(especially since the mid-1990s). However, as argued before, the increasing levels of household 
indebtedness have ultimately contributed to reducing  income  available for private consumption, 
putting a further constraint on consumption growth (on top of the growth in unemployment since the 
turn of the century, which is itself partially related  to the process of credit-led accumulation of debt). 
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